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Abstract
We show that every bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect
information has an ε−perfect equilibrium. Our method consists of
approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of
simple functions, and to consider the corresponding sequence of games,
each differing from the original game only on the payoff function.
In addition, this approach yields a new characterization of perfect
equilibria: a strategy f is a perfect equilibrium in such a game G if
and only if it is an 1/n−perfect equilibrium in Gn for all n, where
{Gn} stands for our approximation sequence.
1 Introduction
Games of perfect information provide a useful framework in order to un-
derstand some economic problems. In such games, the notion of perfect
equilibrium is the natural equilibrium concept since it captures the notion of
sequential rationality: in particular, because players can compute opponents’
optimal future behavior at each point in time, they will not be misled by
empty threats made by their opponents. Therefore, the question of existence
of perfect equilibria in games of perfect information is clearly of interest.
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A general existence theorem was established by Harris [6]. His result ap-
plies to games of perfect information in which players’ payoff functions are
continuous, and their choice sets are compact sets that depend continuously
on the choices made previously. In this note we show that any game of per-
fect information has an ε−perfect equilibrium, assuming only that players’
payoff functions are bounded, and continuous at infinity. In this way, we
present a method for establishing existence of perfect equilibria in bounded,
continuous at infinity games of perfect information: we need only to check
whether the particular game we are interested in satisfies enough continuity
and compactness properties to guarantee that limits of sequences of out-
comes induced by ε−perfect equilibria, with ε converging to zero, are perfect
equilibrium outcomes.1
Our approach consists of approximating the payoff function of each player
by a sequence of simple functions, in a way that is standard in measure and
integration theory (see, for example, Wheeden and Zygmund [10]). The se-
quence of approximating payoff functions for each player, in addition to being
a sequence of simple functions, satisfies two other important properties: first,
1That it is enough to focus on outcomes rather than on strategies follows from Bo¨rgers
[2], and Hellwig et al. [8].
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it converges uniformly to the payoff function of that player in the original
game; and second, any approximating function depends only on finite his-
tories in the following sense: we can find an integer t such that if any two
infinite histories coincide in the first t periods, then they yield the same
payoff.
The above approximation of each player’s payoff function induces a se-
quence of games that differs from the original game only in the payoff func-
tion. For this sequence of games, it is easy to establish that each of them
has a perfect equilibrium since they can be solved by backwards induction.
Also, given ε > 0, perfect equilibria of the approximating games far out in
the sequence will be ε−perfect equilibria of the original game. Thus, every
bounded, continuous at infinity game of perfect information has an ε−perfect
equilibrium, for all ε > 0. Furthermore, we can find a subsequence of the
approximating games in a way that the set of perfect equilibria of the original
game G consists of those strategies that, for all n, are 1/n−perfect equilibria
of Gn, where {Gn} denotes the sequence of approximating games.
Our work is, thus, related to that of Fundenberg and Levine [3], and [4],
Harris [5], and Bo¨rgers [1], all of which present characterizations of perfect
equilibria in terms of ε−equilibria of truncated games. Our results are also
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related to the limiting results of Bo¨rgers [2] and Hellwig et al. [8]. Our ap-
proach differs from theirs essentially in the approximations to a given game
that we consider. Given a game G of perfect information, we consider approx-
imating games that differ from G only in the payoff functions; in addition,
the sequence of payoff functions of the approximation games converges uni-
formly to the payoff functions of G. These two properties make it very easy
to deal with limiting properties.
2 Games of Perfect Information
Our notation follows closely upon that used by Harris [6]. There is a finite
set of players 1 ≤ i ≤ N , each of which chooses independently some action
in every period of time, time being discrete. For t ∈ N, period t’s outcome
is an element of St = ×Ni=1Sti. A history of the game is an element of S =
{0} × ×∞t=1St, where {0} is included for notational convenience. Given x =
(x0, x1, . . .) ∈ S, and t ∈ N, λtx = (x0, . . . , xt) denotes the first t components
of x, and µtx = (xt, xt+1, . . .) the sequence of outcomes from t onwards.
A game of perfect information is a pair G = (H,P ) where H is a non-
empty subset of S, and P : H → RN (the function Pi : H → R is player
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i’s payoff function), satisfying the property that at each point in time only
one player can make a choice. Formally, for any t ∈ N, and x ∈ H let
At(λt−1x) = {yt : y ∈ H,λt−1y = λt−1x} denote the set of outcomes that
are possible in period t given the history λt−1x. As players choose indepen-
dently, then At(λt−1x) = ×Ni=1Ati(λt−1x). The assumption that at each point
in time only one player can make a choice is formalized by imposing that for
all t ∈ N, and x ∈ H, at most one of the sets {Ati(λt−1x)} is not a singleton.
A strategy for player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is a sequence of functions fi = {fti}∞t=1,
where fti : λt−1H → Sti, and fti(λt−1x) ∈ Ati(λt−1x), for all t ∈ N, and x ∈
H. A strategy profile f is a vector of individual strategies: f = (f1, . . . , fN).
Let F (H) denote the set of all strategy profiles (or strategies, for short),
and F i(H) denote the set of all player i’s strategies. If hi ∈ F i(H), and
f ∈ F (H), then f \ hi denotes the strategy resulting from replacing player
i’s strategy f i by hi.
Given a strategy f , x ∈ H, and t ∈ N, α[f, x, t] ∈ H denotes the history
resulting if f is employed from period t+1 onwards after an initial history λtx.
For ε ≥ 0, a strategy f is an ε−perfect equilibrium of the game G = (H,P )
if Pi(α[f, x, t]) ≥ Pi(α[f \ hi, x, t])− ε for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , hi ∈ F i(H), x ∈ H,
and t ≥ 0. A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium of the game G = (H,P ) if it
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is a 0-perfect equilibrium. Let PE(G) denote the set of perfect equilibria of
the game G, and PEε(G) the set of ε−perfect equilibria of the game G.
A game (H,P ) of perfect information is continuous at infinity if for all
ε > 0 and all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , there exists T ∈ N, such that |Pi(x)− Pi(y)| < ε
for all x, y ∈ H satisfying λT (x) = λT (y). This definition is due to Fudenberg
and Levine [3]. A game (H,P ) of perfect information is bounded if for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N , Pi is bounded.
3 Approximation by Simple Games, Existence
of Perfect Equilibria and of ε− Perfect Equi-
libria
In this section we show that every bounded, and continuous at infinity game
has an ε−perfect equilibrium by using simple games approximations. We
then use the model of Harris and Vickers [7] to show how this fact can be
used to prove the existence of perfect equilibria. Also, we characterize the
set of perfect equilibria of any bounded, and continuous at infinity game in
terms of ε−perfect equilibria of those simple games.
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Theorem 1 Let G = (H,P ) be a game of perfect information, and assume
that G is continuous at infinity, and bounded. Then, for all ε > 0, G has an
ε−perfect equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we will use the following construction: By
Wheeden and Zygmund [10, theorem 4.13, page 54] and the remark imme-
diately after, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N there exists a sequence {V ki }k of simple
functions converging uniformly to Pi. If B > 0 is such that |Pi(x)| < B,
then, for k ∈ N, we may let V ki : H → R be defined by
P ki (h) =
j − 1
2k
if
j − 1
2k
≤ Pi(h) < j
2k
for j = −B2k, . . . , B2k. Define P ki : H → R by
V ki (x) = inf{V ki (y) : λky = λkx},
and define Gk = (H,Pk). The sequence {Gk} is a sequence of simple games
that approximate G in the following sense.
Lemma 1 Let G = (H,P ) be a game of perfect information, and assume
that G is continuous at infinity, and bounded. Let Gk be as above. Then,
1. limk→∞ ||V ki − P ki ||∞ = 0,
2. limk→∞ ||P ki − Pi||∞ = 0.
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Proof. Let η > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N and let T ∈ N be such that k ≥ T implies
||V ki − Pi||∞ < η,
and
|Pi(x)− Pi(y)| < η
for all x, y ∈ H satisfying λTx = λTy.
Let x ∈ H and k ≥ T. If y ∈ H is such that λky = λkx, then λTy = λTx
and so
∣∣V ki (x)− V ki (y)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣V ki (x)− Pi(x)∣∣+ |Pi(x)− Pi(y)|+ ∣∣Pi(y)− V ki (y)∣∣ < 3η,
which implies
V ki (x)− 3η ≤ P ki (x) ≤ V ki (x).
Hence,
||V ki − P ki ||∞ ≤ 3η.
This establishes 1. Also, it implies that
||P ki − Pi||∞ < 4η,
which establishes that P ki converges uniformly to Pi.
Note that the game Gk has a perfect equilibrium. This follows because
each player i is indifferent between every strategy that prescribes the same
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actions in periods 1 through k. Hence, for t ≥ k + 1, we may specify some
arbitrary action for the player choosing in period t independently of the
history and use backward induction to specify strategies for players choosing
in periods 1 through k. This fact is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For all k ∈ N, Gk has a perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ N , t ∈ N, t > k, and x ∈ H. Let a ∈ Ati(λt−1x)
define fti(λt−1x) = a. This defines {ft}∞t=k+1. Clearly, P ki (α[f, x, t]) ≥
P ki (α[f \ hi, x, t]), for all hi ∈ F i(H), since, by definition, we have that
P ki (x) = P
k
i (y) whenever λkx = λky.
Consider t ≤ k, and assume that {fj}∞j=t+1 has already been defined in a
way that P ki (α[f, x, j]) ≥ P ki (α[f \ hi, x, j]), for all hi ∈ F i(H), and j ≥ t.
We have that {P ki (α[f, (λt−1x, a), t]) : a ∈ Ati(λt−1x)} is finite, since P ki
is simple. So there exists a∗ that maximizes a 7→ P ki (α[f, (λt−1x, a), t]) in
Ati(λt−1x). Thus, define fti(λt−1x) = a∗. In order to establish the inductive
hypothesis for t, let hi ∈ F i(H). Define gi ∈ F i(H) by
gli =

hli if l = t
fli otherwise.
(1)
Let yt = (hti(λt−1x), ft,−i(λt−1x)), and let x\yt denote the history that differs
from x only because xt was replaced by yt. By the inductive hypothesis, we
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have that P ki (α[f, x\yt, t]) ≥ P ki (α[f\hi, x\yt, t]), which implies that P ki (α[f\
gi, x, t−1]) ≥ P ki (α[f\hi, x, t−1]). Then, by construction, P ki (α[f, x, t−1]) ≥
P ki (α[f \ gi, x, t− 1]).
Thus we have defined a strategy f with the property that P ki (α[f, x, t]) ≥
P ki (α[f \ hi, x, t]), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , hi ∈ F i(H), x ∈ H, and t ≥ 0. Clearly,
f is a perfect equilibrium of Gk.
By lemma 2, it remains to show that any perfect equilibrium of Gk is
an ε−perfect equilibrium of G provided that k is sufficiently large. This is
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let ε > 0. Then there is K ∈ N such that k ≥ K and f ∈
PE(Gk) implies that f is an ε−perfect equilibrium of G.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and let K ∈ N be such that ||P ki − Pi||∞ < ε2 for all
k ≥ K. Let k ≥ K and f be a perfect equilibrium of Gk. We will show that
f is an ε−perfect equilibrium of G.
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ N , hi ∈ F i(H), x ∈ H, and t ≥ 0. Then, P ki (α[f, x, t]) ≥
P ki (α[f \ hi, x, t]) and so
ε
2
+ Pi(α[f, x, t]) > P
k
i (α[f, x, t]) ≥
≥ P ki (α[f \ hi, x, t]) > Pi(α[f \ hi, x, t])−
ε
2
,
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that is, Pi(α[f \ hi, x, t])− Pi(α[f, x, t]) ≤ ε.
Part of the interest of approximating a given game G of perfect infor-
mation by the sequence {Gk} of games is that each Gk can be solved by
backwards induction. This is clearly an important property when one is in-
terested in computing the equilibrium set of any game of perfect information.
Thus, it is interesting to know whether the equilibrium set of any such game
G can be computed using the games in {Gk}. The following result answers
this question.
Theorem 2 Let G = (H,P ) be a game of perfect information, and assume
that G is continuous at infinity, and bounded. Let Gk be as above. Then,
there exists a subsequence {Gkn} of {Gk} such that
PE(G) =
∞⋂
n=1
PE 1
n
(Gkn).
Proof. For n ∈ N, let kn be such that ||V kni −P kni ||∞ < 1/2n; its existence
is guaranteed by lemma 1.
Let f ∈ ∩∞n=1PE 1
n
(Gkn), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , hi ∈ F i(H), x ∈ H, and t ≥ 0.
Then, P kni (α[f, x, t]) ≥ P kni (α[f \ hi, x, t])− 1/n, for all n, and so, by lemma
1, it follows that Pi(α[f, x, t]) ≥ Pi(α[f \ hi, x, t]). Hence f ∈ PE(G).
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Let f ∈ PE(G). It is straightforward to verify that Pi(x) ≥ Pi(y) implies
that V ki (x) ≥ V ki (y) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , k ∈ N, and x, y ∈ H. This clearly
implies that f is a perfect equilibrium of (H,V k). Let n ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , hi ∈
F i(H), x ∈ H, and t ≥ 0. Then, V kni (α[f, x, t]) ≥ V kni (α[f \hi, x, t]) together
with ||V kni −P kni ||∞ < 1/2n implies P kni (α[f, x, t]) ≥ P kni (α[f \hi, x, t])−1/n.
Hence, f ∈ ∩∞n=1PE 1
n
(Gkn).
An important implication of Theorem 1 is that in order to establish the
existence of a perfect equilibrium in a game of perfect information we need
just enough continuity to guarantee that limits of ε−equilibria, with ε > 0
converging to zero, exist and are equilibria. Sufficient conditions for this
result are given in Reny [9], which, although stated for normal form games,
can be easily adapted to games of perfect information. However, sometimes
the above property can be easily established directly. The model of Harris
and Vickers [7] provides such an example.
Harris and Vickers [7] have modelled a race: two players, A and B, are
in competition for a single indivisible prize, which has value VA for player
A and VB for player B. At the outset of the game, players A and B are
respectively at distances x0 and y0 from the finishing line; progress towards
the finishing line depends upon the bids made by each player, which are the
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actions they choose. Players bid alternatively, first A, then B, then A again
and so on, and the prize is awarded to the first player (if any) to reach the
finish line.
More precisely, the game is as follows: there are two players, A and B,
who choose alternatively, first A, then B, then A again and so on. Each
player chooses a point from S = [0,M ], for some M ∈ R++, independently
of the previous history.
To define players’ payoffs we proceed as follows: let x0, y0, VA, VB > 0,
0 < ρA, ρB < 1 and let wA, wB be strictly increasing, continuous functions
from S to R, satisfying wA(0) = wB(0) = 0. Let {a2k−1}∞k=1 and {b2k}∞k=1
denote the choices of player A and B, respectively, and define, for k ≥ 1,
x2k−1 = x2(k−1)−1 − wA(a2k−1)
and
y2k = y2(k−1) − wB(b2k).
Let S∞ = ×n∈NSn, with Sn = S, for all n ∈ N. For s ∈ S∞, let γ(s) denote
the smallest integer n such that either xn ≤ 0 or yn ≤ 0. Finally, the payoff
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for player A is defined by
PA(s) =

ρk−1A VA −
∑∞
i=1 ρ
2i−1
A s2i−1 if γ (s) = k <∞ and k is odd
−∑∞i=1 ρ2i−1A s2i−1 otherwise.
and the payoff for player B is defined by
PB(s) =

ρk−1B VB −
∑∞
i=1 ρ
2i
Bs2i if γ (s) = k <∞ and k is even
−∑∞i=1 ρ2i−1B s2i−1 otherwise.
Let GR denote the above game. Clearly, all the assumptions of Theorem
1 of Harris [6] are satisfied, except the continuity of the payoff functions.
However, they are bounded, and continuous at infinity. We will show the
existence of a perfect equilibrium by a limit argument involving ε−perfect
equilibria. An important part of the argument consists of showing that Pi,
i = A,B, is continuous at limit points of εn−perfect equilibrium outcomes
of GR, εn → 0.
Lemma 4 Let {fn}∞n=1 be a sequence of εn−perfect equilibria of GR, εn → 0,
i ∈ {A,B}, z ∈ H, and k ∈ N. If {α[fn, z, k]}∞n=1 is a converging sequence
of outcomes, with v = limn α[fn, z, k], then limn Pi(α[fn, z, k]) = Pi(v).
Proof. Let z ∈ H, and k ∈ N.
Note first that we may assume that under z no player wins the race before
k (i.e., xl[v], yl[v] > 0, for all l ≤ k), since in this case the result is obvious.
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We will assume that the player that moves in period k+1 is player A,(the
case in which the player that moves in period k + 1 is player B is exactly
symmetric), and we will consider two cases:
Case 1: Under v, player A wins the race in period l > k.
Let l be such that xl[v] ≤ 0 and xκ[v] > 0, for all κ < l. Since wA is
continuous, it follows that there is N1 ∈ N such that xκ[fn, z, k] > 0, and
yκ[fn, z, k] > 0, for all κ < k, if n ≥ N1. Also, since 0 < ρA < 1, there is N2
such that n ≥ N2 implies
ρk−1A VA −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[v] > ρ
j−1
A VA −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k] + εn
for all j > l. Since fn is an εn−perfect equilibrium, it follows that xl[fn, z, k] ≤
0. Hence, for all n ≥ max{N1, N2},
PA(α[fn, z, k]) = ρ
l−1
A VA −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k],
and so
limPA(α[fn, z, k]) = PA(v).
Case 2: Under v, player B wins the race.
By the argument above for case 1, it follows that B will win the race
under fn, for n large enough. Thus,
PA(α[fn, z, k]) = −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k]→ −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[v] = PA(v).
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Case 3: Under v, neither player wins the race.
Let δ > 0, and let L be such that l ≥ L implies that ρl−1A VA < δ2 . Let N
be such that n ≥ N implies that xL[fn, z, k] > 0 and∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k]−
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[v]
∣∣∣∣∣ < δ2 .
Then, since xL[fn, z, k] > 0, it follows that
−
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k] ≤ PA(α[fn, z, k]) ≤ ρL−1A VA −
∞∑
i=1
ρ2i−1A s2i−1[fn, z, k],
and so
|PA(α[fn, z, k])− PA(v)| < δ
2
+ ρL−1A VA < δ.
We have shown that limn PA(α[fn, z, k]) = PA(v). The argument pre-
sented so far can also be used to show that limn PB(α[fn, z, k]) = PB(v)
in the following way: if neither player wins the race, then the same ar-
gument can be used for player B; if player A wins the race under z then
limn PB(α[fn, z, k]) = PB(v) can be shown in the same way we showed that
limn PA(α[fn, z, k]) = PA(v) in case 2.
A second important part of the argument showing existence of a perfect
equilibrium through a limit argument involving ε−perfect equilibria con-
sists of defining a strategy which is in some sense a limit of the sequence of
ε−perfect equilibria.
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Lemma 5 Let {fn}∞n=1 be a sequence of εn−perfect equilibria of GR, εn → 0,
and f a strategy satisfying the following properties: for all x ∈ H, and t ∈ N,
1. there exists a subsequence {fn}n∈D[λtx] such that limn→∞,n∈D[λtx] α[fn, x, t] =
α[f, x, t], and
2. D[λt+1x] ⊆ D[λtx].
Then f is a perfect equilibrium of GR.
Proof. Let i ∈ {A,B}, x ∈ H, and t ∈ N be given, and consider a
single deviation in period t + 1 after history λtx. For concreteness, assume
that player A chooses in period t + 1, and that he chooses a instead of
f(λtx). Denote by h
A the resulting player A’s strategy. Note that α[fn \
hA, x, t] = α[fn, y, t + 1], where yt = a, and yk = xk for all k 6= t, and so
λtx = λty. We have that PA(α[fn, x, t]) ≥ PA(α[fn \ hA, x, t]) − εn. Since
D[λt+1y] ⊆ D[λty] = D[λtx], then letting n → ∞, with n ∈ D[λt+1y], we
obtain PA(α[f, x, t]) ≥ PA(α[f \ hA, x, t]).
By Theorem 1, we know that for any bounded, continuous at infinity game
there exists a sequence of εn−perfect equilibria with εn → 0. Furthermore,
the construction in Bo¨rgers [2], and Hellwig et al. [8] shows that given any
such sequence we can define f in such a way that properties 1 and 2 above
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hold since H is compact in GR. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 GR has a perfect equilibrium.
We note that lemmas 4 and 5 provide a general approach to the question of
existence of perfect equilibria in games of perfect information: any bounded,
continuous at infinity game of perfect information for which those lemmas
hold, and for which we can construct strategies in the way described in lemma
5, will have at least one perfect equilibrium.
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